Welcome back to Off the Record after another hectic week.

I like to joke with our Deputy Head of EU News, Maia de la Baume, that things cannot get crazier with each passing week. Every time, I’m proved wrong. It’s bad news for my immune system, which has finally succumbed to a cold.

This week, I spent some time in Warsaw before the European Council summit in Brussels, which wrapped up as I sat down to file this newsletter next to my Kleenex. Friday night fun is subjective, right?

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was in Brussels yesterday for the summit, looking to shore up support after a brutal week for Kyiv. The mood in Ukraine heading into the winter couldn't be grimmer. 

Fears of abandonment mounted this week after the US announced a shocking deal to ease sanctions on Russian diesel in a desperate attempt to bring down fuel prices. The deal is deeply flawed. It gives Russia a fresh revenue boost with no strings attached and little to show for it beyond temporary relief. 

By now, it should be clear that President Donald Trump is freaking out about the US midterm elections. Petrol prices have surged since the start of the year, pushing up the cost of living for Americans. Across the Atlantic, the US national average for gas prices hit $4.27 a gallon this week.

If you know anything about Americans, they expect cheap energy – and plenty of it. Prices at the pump and fears of an economic downturn will prove decisive in the midterms.

Much of the pain stems from the collateral effects of the US-Israeli war on Iran. Now, you could argue that Tehran poses a real threat to the world's security and, as Trump himself has suggested, that the country is led by a bunch of crazy people. They are. But they are not dumb. 

Iran has successfully weaponised the Strait of Hormuz, choking off the passage of roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply. That's a problem for everyone. And someone is going to have to take the blame. Trump has picked Zelenskyy.

Sure, Ukraine is knocking out Russian refineries, hitting Moscow where it hurts and reducing global refining capacity. But that is not the root of the problem. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz is - and Trump doesn't have a quick solution for it. 

Instead, the US president has sharply escalated his rhetoric against Zelenskyy, accusing him of creating “problems for our ranchers, our farmers, and the world”. He also suggested Zelenskyy, whom he once described as “a modestly successful comedian,” claims to want peace with Russia while working against it. Ukraine should therefore get a new leader. 

This is a shocking statement to make about a country that is surviving daily missile strikes and, coincidentally or not, has encountered serious operational difficulties this week with critical intelligence and infrastructure needed to prevent more people from dying.

Trump has never used that kind of language towards Russia’s Vladimir Putin. He has never called on Putin to hold free elections, either. His words reveal a striking bias that is inappropriate for a country seeking to mediate between the two sides. There is also an element of personal animosity.

The US president has criticised everything about Zelenskyy: his military attire (he now wears a black jacket), his manners (remember the “you don’t have the cards” episode?) and his refusal to budge. Trump’s frustration seems to stem from his perception of Zelenskyy as an obstacle to peace.

Much can be said about Zelenskyy’s tactics, his diplomatic faux pas and the serious corruption allegations involving his senior staff. But when it comes to the war, he is right to stand his ground: the quick deal Trump wants is bad for both Ukraine and Europe.

Zelenskyy also makes a fair point: refineries become legitimate military targets when they help fund the Russian war machine. You could argue that pressure is necessary in any negotiation to force tough decisions – but it has to go both ways. Trump seems intent in applying it in only one direction.

That reflects the US administration’s calculus. Washington appears convinced that the war is unlikely to change much: the conflict has become a war of attrition, the frontline is largely frozen, and Ukraine cannot win back the territories Russia occupies while inflicting brutal damage on civilians. The human cost will go up, but little will change on the ground. 

The US also seems to believe – wrongly, in my view– that Putin can be coaxed back to the negotiating table through business deals and economic incentives, and by persuading Moscow that ending the war is in its own interest. But this approach risks fundamentally misreading Putin’s motivations.

Don't just take my word for it. 

In 2021, Putin published an essay titled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”. He argued that the two were one people, effectively denying the historical legitimacy of Ukrainian independence. The full-scale war broke out a year later.

For Ukrainians, this is a war of survival – the survival of an independent nation.

Zelenskyy has not budged on territorial concessions, and understandably so, because what is at stake goes beyond a piece of land. No one has yet explained what would happen after a hypothetical territorial swap, which Kyiv would never recognise de jure anyway. Is the US prepared to offer ironclad security guarantees in return? And what would those guarantees look like in practice?

No country would willingly give up part of its territory – including land Russia does not even control – in exchange for promises that, for now, amount to little more than words. And what would happen to the wider European security architecture, which has gone up in flames as a result of the invasion? 

Zelenskyy arrived in the Belgian capital on Friday with a message of gratitude. He thanked the institutions and EU leaders, who he described as “real leaders” in an apparent dig at Trump. But he also showed up with a list of unresolved issues.

Ukraine is heading into a rough winter, with much of its energy infrastructure destroyed by Russia, an urgent need for air defence and billions in fresh funding for 2027. In his address to leaders, he said the war next year would cost €155 billion, of which €70 billion would have to be financed by the Europeans. He urged them to find the resources, arguing that his estimate is realistic.

Two things stand out. Ukraine is working on the basis that the war will last at least another year, so it has to budget for it. And Europeans will have to foot a substantial part of the bill, with the US no longer providing any assistance.

Last December, European leaders signed off on a €90 billion loan that was supposed to cover two years of financial needs. By now, we know it won’t be enough. And Ukraine will probably never be able to repay it.

The question of financing may be a crude one, but it is a critical one.

European leaders know that cash is tight. The EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, told me in an interview this week that it is palpable that European public opinion has changed compared with four years ago, as there is an element of fatigue.

The mega election cycle in Europe over the next 12 months doesn’t play into Ukraine’s hands, and the EU should be clear-eyed about it.

In France, Marine Le Pen, who is leading in the polls, used a visit to Brussels this week to send a message to both Brussels and Zelenskyy: she ain’t paying.

On the basis that France is “on the brink of default”, Le Pen said the country could no longer afford to contribute to the common pot for Ukraine. If others want to pay, she said, that is fine, but France won't.

She seems to be taking a cue from the Trumpian playbook: Ukraine is not her taxpayers’ problem. In Germany, the AfD says Berlin shouldn’t either. To be sure, this is a minority position within the EU Council, and it is not even clear that these parties will come to power. But that doesn’t mean they should be ignored.

These parties are successfully tapping into a growing social and economic malaise in Europe. It doesn’t work in Ukraine’s favour. And there is also a legitimate question at the heart of this debate: where will the European Union find €70 billion to €90 billion, potentially every year?

Issue more debt? Tap the frozen Russian assets? Open up the pool of international donors? Use its leverage over third countries to increase their contributions? And what is the strategy behind this massive war effort?

As leaders gathered in Brussels, they instructed the European Commission to come up with options to plug the financing gap by November. Privately, diplomats agree that it will be up to Europe to keep Ukraine in the fight or give Russia the upper hand. But it is not clear how they will get there. 

Emmanuel Macron told reporters it was much too soon to talk about €70 billion, but several diplomats told Euronews that Brussels would probably have to raise fresh debt. While there has been talk of reviving the idea of using the Russian frozen assets, it remains a long shot, close to wishful thinking.

The hour is grave for Ukraine. Difficult decisions will have to be made.

Thank you for reading Off the Record. You can email me at maria.tadeo@euronews.com

— Maria Tadeo