Pivotal U.S. Summit Could Help Mend a Fractured Syria
Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa makes a crucial first visit to the White House, with the reconstruction of his war-battered country at stake if he is able to persuade U.S. lawmakers to lift sanctions.
By Steven A. Cook via CFR.org
NOVEMBER 6, 2025
It has been a momentous eleven months since Syria’s ousted former leader Bashar al-Assad took flight to Moscow, ending his family’s fifty-three-year repressive rule in Syria. About six weeks after Syria’s liberation, the factions that overthrew Assad declared the leader of one of those factions, Ahmed al-Sharaa, the new president.
Sharaa, previously known as Abu Mohamed al-Jolani, had led a government of opposition in Idlib province, which was beyond Assad’s control. It was by all measures repressive and based in Islamist interpretations of law and conceptions of order. Yet since coming to power, the former leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—a jihadist group with an al-Qaeda lineage—has struck a more measured approach to governance.
In turn, virtually every Western diplomat who has met Sharaa refers to him as a “pragmatist.” This pragmatism has even won the new Syrian leader a November 10 visit to the White House, the first ever for a Syrian president. How Sharaa rules his impoverished, broken, and politically divided country remains an open question, but clearly U.S. President Donald Trump believes a White House visit will help unlock much-needed reconstruction assistance and set Syria on a positive path.
Assembling a new Syria
Since Sharaa came to power, the new Syrian leader declared the country to be for “all Syrians.” He promulgated an interim constitution, which provides for equality, freedom of expression, and due process, among other important provisions found in democracies.
The new government also held elections in October for a 210-seat legislature of which 70 seats are reserved for direct presidential appointments, and the remaining chosen indirectly through electoral subcommittees. Given Syria’s civil war-ravaged infrastructure, Sharaa argued that it would have been difficult to stage direct elections to the People’s Assembly. Left unsaid, of course, was the fact that large parts of northern, eastern, and southern Syrian remain beyond the government’s control.
Sharaa also had a coming out of sorts when he addressed the UN General Assembly on September 24, during which he framed the end of the Assad regime and rise of his new government as a triumph of civilization and values [PDF], while promising transitional justice and peaceful coexistence. Throughout the last eleven months, Sharaa and his high-profile foreign minister—Assad al-Shaibani—have been consistent in their messaging: Syria is for all Syrians regardless of sect or ethnicity, the country is a threat to no one, and the government’s priority is reconstruction.
In all of Sharaa’s public statements, he has come across as a pragmatist and a statesman. His October 2025 appearance on 60 Minutes was compelling; he was credibly committed to a vision of Syria that is a responsible and constructive actor in the Middle East, as well as a government that treats Syrians with dignity and respect.
There is evidence that this messaging is not merely for Western consumption. On October 10, the Syrian foreign minister made the seventy-mile trip from Damascus to Beirut where he met with his Lebanese counterpart. This was an important step toward recalibrating relations after years in which mistrust, Syrian occupation, and violence marked bilateral ties. So far, Sharaa remains committed to continuing security talks with the Israeli government despite Israel’s regular military operations against targets in Syria and its self-declared buffer zone in the country’s south.
In addition, Syria’s leaders have called upon Syrian refugees to return home—so far, about one million have done so—thereby relieving some of the burden on countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, where about four million Syrian refugees remain.
The call for Syrians to return home is consistent with the transitional constitution that Sharaa ratified in March 2025, though those who are returning do not seem interested in the proto-institutions of a remade Syrian state. They have returned because life as a refugee is difficult, and despite many challenges in post-war Syria, they are hoping that as the country rebuilds, their access to education, medical care, and social services will improve.
A volatile, divided country
Still, a healthy bit of skepticism is required. For all the good feelings around the new Syrian leadership, Syria remains volatile and unstable. Only a portion of Syria is in Sharaa’s control, including Damascus and its environs, plus Idlib, Homs, Aleppo, and most of the Western portion of the country. Although one would never know it sitting in Damascus, armed conflict, terrorism, and violent crime are a fact of life throughout much of Syria.
- Northeast. The Islamic State has returned. It does not control territory, but it has engaged in increasing numbers of hit-and-run attacks targeting Kurds, in particular.
-
Coastal region. Government-affiliated militias massacred Alawis in March. The region is nominally under the government’s control but remains unstable.
-
South. The Israelis have carved out a buffer zone that extends well beyond the 1974 armistice line within twenty-five miles of Damascus. The region has also been a zone of intercommunal violence. A complicated series of events last summer involving attacks and reprisals between Bedouin tribes and the Druze in and around Suweyda prompted Syrian government intervention. Government forces in turn abused and killed an undetermined number of Druze. This, in turn, provoked Israeli intervention, including an air strike on the Syrian Ministry of Defense. Suweyda, which is beyond Israel’s buffer zone but under its protection, has become a hotbed of anti-Sharaa agitation.
Of critical importance is the disposition of Syria’s Kurds and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Since Assad’s fall, there have been on-again, off-again negotiations concerning the integration of the SDF into Syria’s security forces and the place of Kurds in the new Syria. Syrian officials have signaled they are not interested in a federal political system in which Kurds would have a degree of autonomy. Kurdish leaders remain wary of the new order in Damascus, suspicious that leaders with a jihadist background will not try to impose their worldview on the Kurdish community.
Although there have been periodic reports of a deal between the government and Kurdish leaders on the future disposition of the SDF, Syrian officials admitted there had been “no concrete progress” in talks with the Kurds in early November.
The Sharaa effect
Then there is Sharaa himself. Appearing on 60 Minutes in dark jeans, a sport jacket, and sneakers was a nice touch—clearly intended to signal that the new Syrian leader’s jihadist days are well behind him. After Assad’s fall and Sharaa’s emergence, analysts and journalists emphasized that HTS’s leader had broken from the Islamic State and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. That is true. But it remains unclear whether that break was doctrinal as reporting and analyses at the time implied, or whether it had to do with power politics among jihadist leaders. Sharaa’s record in Idlib raises serious questions about his ostensible ideological evolution, though his messaging since coming to power suggests he might be the first jihadist to become a statesman.
A long list of European and American diplomats have wagered that Sharaa is indeed a “pragmatist.” The most important among them is Trump, who is hosting Sharaa at the White House in November. Upon meeting the Syrian president in Riyadh in May, Trump averred that Sharaa was a “young, attractive guy—tough guy” with a “strong past.” It is precisely that past that has given others, including members of Congress, pause.
Sharaa’s jihadist background is the biggest obstacle to the most critical issue confronting Damascus and no doubt at the top of the Syrian president’s agenda with Trump: lifting the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (known commonly as the “Caesar Act”). When Trump lifted sanctions on Syria, they were limited to those imposed by executive order (EO). Those imposed through congressional legislation like the Caesar Act remained in place, though Trump did issue an EO that provided a 180-day waiver on those prohibitions. That waiver is set to expire on January 1, 2026.
The weight of the Caesar Act
The Caesar Act prohibits the sale or transfer of virtually any good, technology, or equipment that would aid Syria’s postwar recovery. As a result, financial institutions are unwilling to underwrite reconstruction, and large companies will not enter the country. According to the World Bank, Syria’s reconstruction will cost between $200 and $345 billion and the UN Development Program estimates [PDF] that Syria’s gross domestic product will not recover to pre-war levels until 2080.
The Caesar Act remains on the books despite the fact that the new Syrian government has met all the criteria for lifting it. The sticking point for members of Congress is clearly Sharaa’s profile combined with the massacres of Alawis, violence against the Druze, and the reluctance of the Kurds to become integrated in the new order.
That is why Sharaa’s visit to Washington is so crucial. During his visit, he needs to (as reports are indicating) announce Syria’s participation in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. This would go a long way of convincing skeptical members of Congress that Syria can be a constructive actor in the Middle East. Parallel to these efforts, Sharaa should assure American political leaders that he remains committed to negotiations with Israel. Normalization of relations is unlikely, but an agreement on border security and a commitment to confidence-building measures would also help sway fence-sitters in Congress.
Syria’s leaders are in a race against time. They need to unlock reconstruction funds both because of the country’s extraordinary needs after major portions were laid to waste during the civil war. Sharaa needs to also understand that delivering long-awaited relief is important for his political prospects. It would have been better had Trump’s commitment to lift sanctions on Syria come with benchmarks and conditions. Yet, given Syria’s massive needs, and the very fact that Syria meets the criteria for lifting the Caesar Act, full sanctions relief now is the best way to help Syrians and help set Syria’s political trajectory.
Steven did not use Artificial Intelligence to generate this content.
Steven is the author of The End of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East.
