SPICY SCOOPS
There is always a lot of information that we hear and find interesting and newsworthy but don’t publish as part of our investigative reporting—and share instead in this newsletter.
WHO WILL WIN? ANALYZING CZECH ELECTION POLLS
In this special feature, I’ve condensed data expert—and Investigace.cz journalist—Josef Šlerka’s Data Boutique podcast conversation with pollster Tereza Friedrichová (NMS) and election betting expert Michal Sirový (you can find the original discussion here, especially if you speak Czech). First, the numbers: NMS’s latest poll (fieldwork: September 24–28) puts Babiš’s ANO at 29.5%, with potential allies SPD (far-right) at 13.1%, Motorists (also far-right/libertarian) at 7.7%, and Stačilo (left-wing) at 7.3%. That’s the opposition bloc. Meanwhile, coalition members SPOLU (moderate right-wing alliance) stand at 17.8%, STAN (the mayors’ party) at 11.8%, and the Pirates (who left the government, then allied with the Greens) at 9.6%.
How accurate are these numbers? According to Friedrichová, pollsters always work with confidence intervals: the margin of error is about ±3 points for large parties and ±1.5 for smaller ones. “We have a very proportional vote-to-seat conversion, but a narrow half-point victory won’t be enough for the government bloc. They need about 2–3 points on top,” Sirový explained. Even if polls fail, he argues, they won’t fail enough for Fiala’s bloc to hold on. “The victory would have to be massive. It’s hard to imagine an event that could bring the government the hundreds of thousands of voters it minimally needs.”
Friedrichová highlights that the current “gap between blocs is 850,000 voters–a similar number to the wasted votes in the last election” from small parties not meeting the 5% threshold in 2021. “The government failed to reach those voters and didn’t even try. Paradoxically, governing parties are moving closer to each other instead of dividing the field better to reach a broader spectrum.” She also notes that the coalition lost appeal among youth: “Last time, no one addressed young voters until SPOLU reached out at the last minute, and they massively voted for SPOLU. This won’t repeat because ANO is systematically targeting young people on TikTok, while Motorists appeal to young men.”
Sirový agrees that shifts are more likely within blocs than between them. “I think the government bloc will ultimately get its typical 39–41 percent. But there’s a high chance one party gains significantly more than polls show, but only at the expense of another.” The lack of volatility makes a surprise—Fiala’s government staying in power—very unlikely. “This year’s elections are specific because preferences haven’t changed at all. The biggest events were mergers, not campaign performance. The largest shift was when SPD formed a coalition with smaller parties and jumped from 8 to 12 percent,” Sirový said.
Still, one surprise could come from smaller opposition parties failing to clear the 5% threshold. “Small parties… like Motorists or Stačilo… still aren’t safe. Motorists have about a 60 percent chance of getting in, 40 percent chance they won’t. People look at polls and allocate their votes so they don’t ‘waste’ them,” Josef Šlerka noted. Friedrichová agrees that while some social media users loudly dismiss polls as scams, ordinary voters do pay attention—often voting strategically to make sure their ballot doesn’t get lost. Well—we’ll find out soon!
ORBÁNIZATION IN CZECHIA STILL LOOKS UNLIKELY
From a Visegrád Group power dynamics perspective, an illiberal bloc of Hungary and Slovakia, likely joined by the Czechs would, on paper, outnumber Poland. But since even Robert Fico’s Slovak government has not broken with the EU mainstream to back Viktor Orbán’s pro-Kremlin stances on the most critical issues, security and foreign policy experts I’ve talked to say the much more pragmatic Andrej Babiš’s return is unlikely to trigger a dramatic shift. What is expected, however, is a scaling back of Prague’s active and vocal support for Ukraine—though without replacing it with an openly pro-Kremlin line.
Given the strength of the Czech defense industry and its connections to the political elite, an ANO-led government would likely continue arms exports—perhaps less framed as a matter of values or security, and more as business. Potential coalition partners or external backers of a minority ANO government, such as the far-right SPD, the Motorists (if you don’t know who they are, read this piece about their social media star leader, Filip Turek), or even the leftist, pro-Russian Stačilo, could complicate matters. Still, as previous research and analyses published on VSquare have shown (here’s one by CEIAS, and another one by GLOBSEC), pro-Russian sentiment is far weaker in the Czech Republic than in Orbán’s or Robert Fico’s electorates further south.
According to sources connected to Babiš’s circle and Central European security and foreign policy experts I spoke with, there seems to be little appetite for pursuing “Orbánization” anyway. The model has lost its international appeal (see Political Capital’s smart analysis for details). Andrej Babiš’s failed 2023 presidential bid—when his campaign borrowed Orbán’s “pro-peace” slogans, and rivals warned that he would bring Orbánization to Prague—already served as a lesson. This time, ANO has visibly kept its distance from Orbán during the election campaign.
The main driver of ANO’s momentum is widespread dissatisfaction with the economic policies of Petr Fiala’s government—an economy that’s actually still in far better shape than Hungary’s, where mismanagement has also helped push Orbán’s party into second place in the polls. There is also quiet criticism of Orbán within Babiš’s inner circle, shaped in part by direct experience: Babiš’s Agrofert subsidiaries in Hungary have been operating in an environment hit hard by inflation, stagnating growth, and the freeze on EU funds. Probably not too smart to try exporting such a model to Czechia.
ORBÁN'S PET BANK EXPECTED TO FINANCE FAR-RIGHT ALLIES' CAMPAIGNS
With Hungary’s April 2026 election approaching and polls still showing Orbán’s ruling Fidesz trailing opposition leader Péter Magyar’s TISZA party, the gap has narrowed thanks to slightly more mobilized government voters. Still, time appears to be running out for Orbán. This has broader consequences for the European far-right network, as significant funding has already been channeled from Hungary via Orbán-connected MBH Bank and its predecessor, MKB. These banks financed Marine Le Pen’s 2022 presidential campaign and the Spanish far-right Vox party’s national and European Parliament campaigns in 2023 and 2024, to the tune of millions of euros (read more about the latter here).
Multiple Hungarian government-connected sources told me that, as long as Fidesz remains in power, the strategy is to continue boosting allies’ campaigns across Europe “wherever it’s legally and politically possible”—whatever that means. In a worst-case scenario for Orbán, even if defeated, his government would stay in office until May 2026, while control of MBH Bank by a new Hungarian administration could take even longer to materialize. Some key elections where Orbán’s close allies are running are scheduled before May 2026, including the French and Dutch municipal elections in March and the Slovenian parliamentary elections in April—not to mention possible snap elections elsewhere. Previously, I asked MBH Bank whether it plans to finance other far-right parties’ campaigns, but the bank brushed it off with the standard response that client and business information cannot be disclosed due to banking secrecy.
