Points of Return
To get John Authers’ newsletter delivered directly to your inbox, sign up here. Canadians appear to have elected Mark Carney to head a minor
View in browser
Bloomberg

To get John Authers’ newsletter delivered directly to your inbox, sign up here.

Today’s Points:

100 Days for King Dollar


Donald Trump has reached his 100th day in office, the landmark at which all presidents since FDR have been gauged, and the dollar already has a strong verdict. The DXY dollar index, against a basket of other developed market currencies, has given up almost 10%. This is by some way a record in the five decades since Richard Nixon unpegged the dollar from gold in 1971. Trump 2.0 has now become a mirroring outlier for Ronald Reagan’s first 100 days, when the index rose by 10%:

By a curious quirk of fate, Monday was also the centenary of what’s now regarded as possibly history’s greatest currency policy error — Winston Churchill’s decision to return the pound to the gold standard in 1925. That incident laid bare that after a century of dominance, sterling was no longer able to function as the world’s reserve currency. 

This doesn’t necessarily mean that we should regard Trump 2.0 as a signal that dollar hegemony is over, although it lends itself to that probably overdone narrative. As Capital Economics’ Neil Shearing points out, roughly 90% of cross-border transactions are denominated in dollars – which is far more than would be implied by the US share of global GDP or trade. “In effect, the US provides the financial plumbing for the global economy. This gives it enormous influence.” 

In another critical difference with Churchill, there is no clear contender waiting in the wings, thanks to the euro’s institutional problems and China’s reluctance to lift capital controls. But it makes ample sense to ask whether this is the beginning of one of the dollar’s long bear cycles — and whether the loss of confidence can be reversed. 

Taking inflation into account and comparing against a broad range of other currencies, the dollar has a well-established habit of moving in long cycles. The current one started when confidence in the US economy hit rock bottom in the wake of Standard & Poor’s downgrade of US sovereign debt, and it’s now the longest upward trend since the end of the gold peg. A bear market looks overdue:

If the Liberation Day tariffs have provided the catalyst to take down the dollar, that would make sense; the uncertainty surrounding US trade policy now makes it far less appealing. It’s also prompted several leading houses to lower their forecasts and even to proclaim the beginning of a dollar bear market. This is from Deutsche Bank AG’s George Saravelos:

What has changed since the start of the year? The list of superlatives is
long – the largest shift in US trade policy in a century; the biggest pivot in German fiscal policy since reunification; the most significant
reassessment of US geopolitical leadership since World War II, to name a
few. Our view on all these factors is that the preconditions are now in place for the beginning of a major dollar downtrend. 

Deutsche expects the dollar to trend ever closer to the $1.30 level at which it has purchasing power parity with the euro over the remainder of this decade. At present, the euro stands at $1.14.

While stocks, bonds and commodities have all enjoyed significant rebounds since the post-Liberation Day selloff, the dollar hasn’t joined in. That implies that foreigners have been doing much of the selling, while domestic investors must still be buying:

In doing so, however, foreigners are continuing a trend that has been underway for a while. The reserve managers of Japan and China have been reducing their holdings of US Treasuries for years, as this chart from Mansoor Mohi-Uddin, chief economist of the Bank of Singapore, makes clear:

Mohi-Uddin adds that US investors could themselves drive future dollar weakness. “If US managers also start raising their foreign assets in response to this year’s shocks,” he says, “the USD will keep trending lower, too.”

Of late, the dollar’s problem is centered on individual foreign investors, many of whom are affronted by the Trump administration’s tactics. Saravelos shows below that flows into foreign-denominated exchange-traded funds holding US assets have been sharply negative (although in the case of equities this is largely a function of the extreme enthusiasm that followed Trump’s election):

There’s no sign of any recovery among foreigners in the last couple of weeks as the US stock market has rebounded. If the tariff climbdowns have buoyed confidence, it’s been at home, not abroad. EPFR’s data for foreign-domiciled US funds not traded on exchanges shows a broadly similar pattern, although the data do reflect a slight return of demand for equities in recent days:

The selling has mostly come from Europeans. Goldman Sachs’ David Kostin offers this chart showing that they’ve staged a dramatic exit from US equities while other foreign investors have generally held on. These figures incorporate both mutual funds and ETFs:

That can be explained by the confluence of foreign policy and an overpowering need for economic balance. Vice President JD Vance’s speech in Munich was a watershed moment that convinced Germany (and others) that American support could no longer be relied on, and that it was necessary to rearm. Lifting the constitutional brake on borrowing led to a remarkable surge. That’s clearest from indexes of smaller companies most directly exposed to their home economy, the German MDAX and the US Russell 2000. The former has outperformed the latter by 45% since its brief decline following the US election:

For a generation, Germany has been borrowing too little and the US too much. That’s led to a huge accumulation of capital in the US. Rebalancing, as this chart from BCA Research demonstrates, is healthy for all concerned — and there is a lot further to go:

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has hailed German rebalancing as a positive development. He has a valid point that it might not have happened without the hob-nailed US foreign policy.  

If there’s a domestic political lesson from the way the dollar is reacting now compared to Reagan’s 100 days, it’s that change in the US happens within parties, not between them. Southern Democrats instituted segregation, and it took a Southern Democrat, Lyndon Johnson, to do away with it. Reagan ushered in a model of assertive free markets, globalization and foreign policy, which added up to a strong dollar. Now, another Republican is championing intervention in the economy, aggressive protectionism and isolationism. 

Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, both brilliant Democratic politicians, might have had the chance to undo Reaganism, but didn’t. Instead, the job has fallen to a Republican. And it’s obvious what the foreign exchange market thinks of his first 100 days. 

Meanwhile in the Stock Market

Judging presidential performance by the stock market is a fun parlor game, but has little meaning. That said, Trump 2.0’s first 100 days turn out to have been the worst for the presidents going back to Reagan. He was in a close battle with George W. Bush for the title, but the S&P 500, now down 9%, has done slightly worse this time around:

Does this mean much of anything? Not really. Reagan and Clinton initiated two presidencies that would oversee huge bull markets, but their first 100 days resulted in thoroughly meh returns of about 1%. As ever in markets, the most important driver is the price at which you buy — which explains why Trump 2.0 and George W. Bush got off to bad starts after big rallies, while Obama was helped by arriving at the tail end of the worst financial crisis in almost a century.

All of these are good reasons why Trump should never have measured himself against the stock market, as he did during his first term. It’s just as well he isn’t now. 

Taxes, Tariffs and the Laffer Curve

The greatest lament from market-followers tends to concern Trump 2.0’s sequencing. Wall Street was enthusiastic about plans for tax cuts and deregulation, which helped overcome deeply held doubts about tariffs. If only tax policy were done and dusted before the White House started trying to reorganize global trade, the argument goes, markets could have sailed on serenely.

The main justification for ordering priorities this way is that the US needs revenue from somewhere if it is to make further cuts. That could come from tariffs. We can argue about whether tariffs are borne by foreign exporters or by domestic consumers, but they do represent a flow into the Treasury. The first wave is beginning to make itself felt. This chart is from Deutsche:

Does this mean that revenues from the massive tariffs now imposed on China will allow a tax giveaway for Middle America? For this, it’s worth going back to another relic of Reaganomics: the Laffer Curve. Famously promulgated by the economist Arthur Laffer on a napkin, the notion is that the Treasury’s total tax revenue will vary with the tax rate. Confiscatory tax rates will reduce revenue, as they deter people from doing business. 0% and 100% taxes mean zero tax revenue. Here is a Laffer Curve, as published by Investopedia:

The tariffs currently mooted for China are at 145%. The Laffer Curve inspired the belief that the Reagan tax cuts would pay for themselves, which didn’t come true, but it’s probably fair to say that a tariff rate this high will reduce income, not increase it.

Ajay Rajadhyaksha of Barclays Plc argues that the current Chinese tariffs are a trade embargo on both sides. At this level, they will not help US revenues; indeed, the horrible effect on the economy could reduce them. Shortages rather than just higher prices likely lie ahead, with ocean freight bookings from China to the US dropping by 40% to 50% since early April, he says.

“The longer the 145% China tariffs remain, the more the eventual damage,” he says, even if — as seems unlikely — both sides drop tariffs immediately. He’s right about this. Even the hopes for eventual tax relief crucially depend on climbing down from the current China tariffs as soon as possible.

Survival Tips

Returning to Churchill and the gold standard, the best book by far on the dreadful monetary errors of the inter-war years is Liaquat Ahamed’s Lords of Finance. It’s as readable as a novel and tells the story of the remarkable men who tried and failed to guide the world economy. One ended up on trial at Nuremburg. As for Churchill himself, one of the most extraordinary men who ever lived, warts and all, I’ll go with John Lithgow in The Crown. Other nominations welcome. 

More Charts on the Terminal from Points of Return: CHRT AUTHERS

More From Bloomberg Opinion

  • Hal Brands: The US Is Already Losing the New Cold War to China
  • Nir Kaissar: Star Stock Pickers Must Now Beat Their Clones
  • Marc Champion: JD Vance Owes Romania an Apology

Want more Bloomberg Opinion? OPIN. Or you can subscribe to our daily newsletter.

Like Bloomberg's Points of Return? Subscribe for unlimited access to trusted, data-based journalism in 120 countries around the world and gain expert analysis from exclusive daily newsletters like Markets Daily or Odd Lots.

Like getting this newsletter? Subscribe to Bloomberg.com for unlimited access to trusted, data-driven journalism and subscriber-only insights.

Want to sponsor this newsletter? Get in touch here.

You received this message because you are subscribed to Bloomberg's Points of Return newsletter. If a friend forwarded you this message, sign up here to get it in your inbox.
Unsubscribe
Bloomberg.com
Contact Us
Bloomberg L.P.
731 Lexington Avenue,
New York, NY 10022
Ads Powered By Liveintent Ad Choices